Wednesday, September 29, 2010

L 5.9

In regards to the ontological explanation for God’s existence, Kant asserted that it is not reasonable to infer the extramental existence of something merely from it’s definition. (p. 81) His point could be restated that while the ontological explanation might have some explanatory value about the MGBP, that doesn’t mean that the idea of the MGBP necessarily possesses the characteristic of existence. However, Kant missed the point of the ontological explanation. The extramental existence of God is implied in the definition of God’s nature. If it is said that God’s existence isn’t necessary, then you haven’t achieved the desired result; accurately and thoroughly defining the MGBP. Describing the MGBP must necessarily include it’s existence. Otherwise, it is missing a crucial quality. In fact, it would be missing the most meaningful quality possible. If existence isn’t one of the qualities God possesses, what is being discussed?

2 comments:

GearHedEd said...

Anselm's argument boils down to:

"I can imagine it, therefore it must exist."

Not convincing, conjuring God out of thin air...

trae norsworthy said...

Anselm's argument boils down to:
"I can imagine it, therefore it must exist."

this is definitely not a comprehensive representation of the ontological explanation. your characterization reduces ontology to nothing more than fiction and we know that's not the case. we intuitively know that things exist and the ontological explanation is a way of describing the existence of God; not something imaginary.

furthermore, as descartes said, you can't imagine something that doesn't exist at least in part. so, the issue isn't completely one of imagination.